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The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023



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Introduction

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), as the Army's institutional strategy, represents the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. It also communicates the Army's priorities for employing available resources.¹ An analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements, makes clear the Army must be prepared for operations of a type, tempo, pace, and duration different from those we have structured our forces and systems to achieve.² Some assumptions made and processes developed for a Cold War Army or an Army with a "window of opportunity" to transform itself, while valid at the time, are no longer relevant to the current security environment.

The Army, as a key partner in the Joint Team, remains fully engaged throughout the globe in fulfilling its responsibilities to national security. Additionally, the most salient aspect of the current security environment is that we are a Nation and an Army at war – a war unlike any we have experienced in our history. As the National Security Strategy makes clear, "the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism -- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."³ This war is being conducted across the globe and throughout the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists who cannot be deterred, but nevertheless must be prevented from striking against the United States, our allies, and our interests. The current conflict did not begin on September 11th, 2001, and unlike the great wars of the last century, the sort of tangible events that so publicly signaled the end of World War II and the Cold War may not mark its conclusion.

We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force – a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Our Army will retain the best of its current capabilities and attributes while developing others that increase relevance and readiness to respond in the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The remainder of

¹ Army Regulation (AR) 1-1: *Army Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*, 30 January, 1994, http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r1_1.pdf (link valid as of 1 May 2003). The ASPG meets strategic planning requirements outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 1-1, "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System" (PPBES) and AR 11-32, "Army Long Range Planning System" (ALRPS). The ALRPS provides baseline-planning guidance for development of mid- and near-term planning documents; and establish the benchmark used to gauge the level of success in achieving the Army's established long-range goals and mid-term objectives. AR 11-32: *Army Long Range Planning System*, 10 January 1989, http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r11_32.pdf (link valid as of 1 May 2003).

² See Annex A, "National Strategic Guidance" and Annex D, "The Security Environment."

³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (link valid as of 20 May 2003), 5-15.

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this document explores what we must become in order to provide more relevant and ready forces and capabilities to the Joint Team.

Toward a More Relevant and Ready Army

To focus our efforts in increasing the relevance and readiness of our operating and institutional forces, the Army has two core competencies supported by a set of essential and enduring capabilities. **The Army's core competencies are: (1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team.**⁴ To further concentrate effort, the Army's Senior Leadership has established sixteen immediate focus areas with specific guidance for planning, preparation, and execution of actions aimed at rapidly effecting necessary and positive change.⁵ These constitute changes to existing near- and mid-term guidance and are not, nor are they intended to be, all-inclusive.⁶ The complete expression of Army Strategic Objectives for prioritizing and programming purposes is defined in Annex B, which places the Strategic Readiness System within the context of The Army Plan.⁷

⁴ Enduring capabilities include shaping the security environment, executing prompt response, mobilizing the Army, forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance, and support for civil authorities. This represents a change that will be reflected in the next update of FM 1.

⁵ See Annex B, Army Strategic Objectives. The Focus Areas are: AC/RC Balance, The Soldier, The Bench, The Network, Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, Modularity, Force Stabilization, CTC/BCTP, Leader Development and Education, Army Aviation, Installations as Our Flagships, Current to Future Force, Resource Processes, Strategic Communications, Actionable Intelligence, and Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability.

⁶ For the purposes of The Army Plan, the following definitions are used: Near-term is within the Budget Year; Mid-Term is within the POM cycle; Long-Term is beyond the POM cycle. Additional long-term guidance is located in Annex B, "Army Strategic Objectives." The Army's near/mid- and long-term objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid-to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operations of the Defense establishment.

⁷ The Strategic Readiness System assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach – a process analogous to METL development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies and essential and enduring capabilities, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and forecast strategic performance. The Army Strategy Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives described in Annex B of the ASPG. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives. The SRS will identify for senior leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that The Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its enduring mission for the

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The Army will reorganize its combat and institutional organizations to best meet the needs and requirements of operating in the current and projected security environment. We must assume sustained operations will be the norm, and not the exception. As we continue the process of transforming our Army while at war, we will redesign our formations to provide modular, capabilities-based organizations, increasing their relevance and responsiveness to the Combatant Commanders. We will develop in our leaders, Soldiers, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians an unprecedented level of adaptability. We must have balance in our forces, with the ability to operate decisively in an uncertain environment against an unpredictable threat that will make every attempt to avoid our strengths.

Similarly, we will reexamine our doctrine, processes, education, training methodology, and systems to develop and institutionalize a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. As we seek to resolve the issues associated with transforming our Army for the current and future security environment, we must not allow solutions to be constrained by processes, policies, and systems designed for a world-system that no longer exists. Processes and policies can and will change. Systems must adapt to the needs of the Soldier, our Nation, and the Joint Force.

A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset

To successfully prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and ensure our Nation's security, the Army must provide the Joint Force with relevant and ready capabilities and forces to support the National Security and Defense Strategies – a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army provides the Joint Force with the campaign quality combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities necessary to conduct sustained land warfare; this is our unique contribution to the Joint Team and it will be maintained. The challenge we must address is how to transform our organizations, processes, doctrine, and culture so that we are better able to provide this contribution to the Joint Force in a more prompt and rapid manner.

Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the Joint Force commander's ability to defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces, we will expand the Joint Force commander's ability to rapidly deploy, employ and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent. A Joint and Expeditionary Mindset recognizes that we are an Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations and ready to rapidly respond to the next crisis as it evolves. It is an attitude and spirit – infused across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

nation. The development and articulation of the Army's Strategic Objectives is a dynamic and ongoing process. Strategic Objectives are not, and are not intended to be, static and unchanging. They will be periodically updated.

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Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) activities – that embraces a forward leaning, modular, joint interdependent and capabilities-based Army led by aggressive, intelligent and empowered Soldiers who recognize opportunities and confidently apply the appropriate capabilities of the Joint Force in support of the Combatant Commander.

The Army: A Critical Component of the Joint Team

Joint Interdependence. The Army is a critical component of the Joint Team; we must think of ourselves as indispensable and vital members of that team first, and as a Service component second. We must remain aware that the Army always conducts operations – offensive, defensive, stability, and support – in a joint and expeditionary context. Prompt, sustained, and decisive land combat power acts in concert with air and naval power to ensure a synergy that gives the Joint Force capabilities and power well beyond the sum of its parts. In a few short years, the Joint Force has moved from independent, de-conflicted operations to sustained interoperability. It must now move rapidly to joint interdependence.

Joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team's greatest asset. The Army provides the Joint Force Commander with unique and complementary capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. These include supporting civil authorities at home and abroad, providing expeditionary forces, reassuring friends, allies, and coalition partners, dissuading and deterring adversaries, decisively defeating adversaries should deterrence fail, and winning the peace as part of an integrated inter-agency post-conflict effort aimed at achieving enduring victory. We must examine all the capabilities resident in the Joint Force and determine the Service best positioned to provide that capability to the Combatant Commander.⁸ We will then be able to shed excess and redundant capabilities while concentrating our efforts and resources to enhance those capabilities the Army is best suited to contribute to the Joint Team. Both our combat and our logistics formations will become joint interdependent.

Joint Operations Concepts. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describe how the Joint Force intends to operate 15-20 years in the future across the entire range of operations. It provides the operational context for transformation by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. The JOpsC also provides a unifying framework for developing Service concepts and subordinate joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, and enabling concepts. This framework will guide joint operations, as well as providing the foundation for joint and Service concept development and experimentation. The JOpsC represents a critical step in the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which envisions investment in transformational capabilities based on developing joint concepts that are validated through experimentation and informed by joint lessons learned.⁹ Clearly,

⁸ The Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG) will identify Army-unique capabilities vice capabilities resident in the Joint Force.

⁹ CJCSI 3170.01C, JCIDS.

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Army concepts and capabilities must nest within the JOpsC and its unifying framework of subordinate concepts and inform the JCIDS.

The JOpsC builds on the goal of Full Spectrum Dominance: the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations. Full Spectrum Dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation. In order to succeed in an uncertain, dynamic future security environment, the JOpsC emphasizes a capabilities-based and adaptable force in order to balance capabilities and manage risk within a global perspective. The JOpsC identifies the future joint force attributes that the Joint Force must embody to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance.¹⁰

To accomplish assigned missions, the JOpsC advocates a Joint Force that is capable of conducting rapidly executable, simultaneous and sequential operations distributed throughout a non-linear battlespace and conducted in close coordination with interagency and multinational partners. The future Joint Force will be able to rapidly build momentum and close the gaps between decision, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. This will require the Joint Force to organize and train as capabilities-based force packages, which are quickly tailored and scaled for a flexible array of capabilities across the range of military operations.

To succeed, the Joint Force must adopt a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, reflecting greater versatility and deployability, while ensuring the necessary capabilities to conduct both sustained combat and potentially simultaneous operations to reestablish stability. As is clear from the Strategic Objectives discussed in Annex B of this document, we will optimize our forces, capabilities, and organizations to best contribute to the joint capabilities and methods required of each of the joint operating concepts and joint functional concepts.¹¹

Train and Equip Soldiers, and Grow Leaders

Training and Equipping Soldiers. The American Soldier remains indispensable to the Joint Team. Flexible, adaptive, and competent Soldiers infused with the Army's Warrior Culture fight wars and win the peace. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. American Soldiers, possessed of a fierce warrior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat, dominate key assets and terrain, decisively end conflicts, control the movement of people, protect resource flows, and maintain post-conflict stability. We must never forget that it is the Soldier – fierce, disciplined, well trained, and well equipped – who ultimately represents and enables the capabilities we as an Army provide the Joint Force and the Nation.

¹⁰ The seven attributes are: fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision superior, and lethal.

¹¹ See Annex B, "Army Strategic Objectives."

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We must prepare all our Soldiers for the stark realities of the battlefield. No Soldier can survive in the current battlespace without constant training in weapons and fieldcraft and a continuous immersion in the Army's Warrior Culture. There can be only one standard of training for our Soldiers, regardless of component or specialty. Our equipment and systems must be cross-leveled as necessary to support the Soldier in the warfight. We must not forget it is our Soldiers who remain the crucial link to both realizing Future Force capabilities and enhancing the effectiveness of Current Forces. We must treat Soldiers themselves as the ultimate combat system, and to this end, conduct a holistic review and analysis of individual Soldier institutional and unit training, equipping, and readiness needs. As a system, Soldiers must be medically protected and sustained for optimum performance throughout their service.

We must likewise prepare our Soldiers, civilians, and families for the sustained challenge of serving a Nation at war. The Well-Being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families is inextricably linked to our Army's readiness. Our Well-Being programs and family support systems must be synchronized with rotation schedules and optimized to support deployed units anchored by flagship installations. We recognize that our Soldiers and their families need an element of predictability and order in their lives. In the current strategic environment, that equates to knowing when they are most likely to deploy, and making deployments as equitable as possible across the force. Achieving this will require making necessary adjustment to our mix of Active and Reserve Component capabilities and forces. It will also require the use of Force Stabilization initiatives to provide stability for Soldiers and units while enhancing unit cohesion. This will lead to a more capable force. Finally, it will mean rethinking and adapting our installation programs and facilities to better support our Soldiers and their families. The quality and character of our installations is vital to enhancing the well-being of our Soldiers, civilians, and families, as well as enabling the Army's ability to provide trained, ready, and strategically responsive forces to the Combatant Commanders.

Growing Leaders. Leader development systems must be optimized to train and educate leaders capable of operating as part of a Joint Team at war – leaders who possess a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. The Army will take action across a broad front to make jointness an integral part of our culture. Our systems will educate and reward leaders with the mental agility to thrive at all levels in modern war. We must develop in our future leaders the right mix of unit, staff, and command experience, and training and education opportunities to meet the current and future leadership requirements of the Army and the Joint Force. Our leader development systems and facilities will be re-designed for the current and future strategic environment and acknowledge the current and projected pace of operations and deployments. The officer, non-commissioned officer, and DA civilian education systems will be adjusted to reflect our operating environment and deployment patterns, as well as reflecting Force Stabilization initiatives. We will identify, prepare, and assign select Army military and civilian leaders for key positions within Joint, interagency, multinational, and Service organizations and develop and institutionalize the systems required to sustain these assignments.

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To develop and train agile and adaptive leaders able to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations, we will refocus Combat Training Center and Battle Command Training Programs. Leader training and development within these events must complement and help develop the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset and further a Warrior Culture. The training will nest within the Joint National Training Capability and accurately replicate the realities of the contemporary operating environment. Finally, our training institutions must better enable commanders to develop subordinate leaders. Leader and unit training must be more joint and must embed the realities of the current strategic and operational environments. We will focus the training center experience on execution and not overly emphasize the deliberate planning process.

Provide Relevant and Ready Land Power Capability to the Combatant Commander as Part of the Joint Team

Improving Army Contributions to the Joint Team. By developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations and cultivating and institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the force, the Army will greatly increase the Combatant Commander's ability to rapidly defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. Modular, capabilities-based forces will better support Combatant Commander requirements by more effectively enabling the delivery of the right Army capabilities at the right place and time. This is central to optimizing the relevance of Army forces to the Combatant Commander and expanding the Joint Team's ability to rapidly deploy, employ and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent.


Modular, capabilities-based Army force designs will enable greater capacity for rapid and tailorable force capability packages and improve the strategic responsiveness of the Joint Force for full spectrum operations. Modular combat support and combat service support units with reduced logistics footprints, and sense-and-respond logistics capabilities are essential to responsiveness, and they enhance the versatility of the Joint Force to seamlessly transition to sustained operations as a crisis or conflict develops. Informed by operational experience and Future Force designs, the Army will begin in FY04 to implement this modularity in two of its active component divisions. These initial conversions will serve as prototypes to help accelerate the modular redesign and fielding of the Current and Future Forces.

Moving toward completely independent echelon-above-brigade headquarters will also enhance modularity. In accordance with the Unit of Employment (UE) construct, a UE_x (higher tactical headquarters), and a UE_y (operational-level headquarters), will provide the command and control structure into which modular, capabilities-based Units of Action (UA) are organized to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Both types of UE headquarters, while able to accept joint capabilities such as a Standing Joint Force Headquarters element (SJFHQ), will have an organic capability, depending on the contingency, to perform functions as a JTF or JFLCC HQ.

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The Army's ability to successfully provide the Joint Team both rapid expeditionary capabilities and the ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict requires both active and reserve component contributions. We will restructure the Current Force, creating modular capabilities and flexible formations while obtaining the correct mix between AC and RC force structure. This rebalancing effort will enhance the Army's ability to provide the Joint Team relevant and ready expeditionary land power capability (See Figure 1). Our Active Component will provide rapidly responsive, agile, and expeditionary forces that typically respond in the first fifteen days of an operation. The availability of adequate AC and RC follow-on forces provide the Joint Force Commander the campaign quality combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives and to conduct sustained land operations. Our Reserve Component will provide strategic depth to reinforce the warfight. They will also reinforce Support Operations and Stability Operations, and lead our efforts to protect the homeland. Either Active or Reserve Component units may provide units of the other component with additional capabilities not normally resident in those forces. To create and maintain rapidly deployable and sustainable campaign capability and depth throughout the force, we will ensure both Active and Reserve Component forces are modular, tailorable, and capable of coming together in a number of force and capabilities packages. This will

Figure 1: Structuring the Force



allow us to reduce the time now required for mobilization and training and improve our ability to provide Combatant Commanders with needed forces and capabilities.

Redesigning the force requires a complementary and transformational method of building a cohesive team within those organizations. Force Stabilization for brigade units of action and other modular and scaleable forces will provide Combatant Commanders with more combat-ready formations. We will define and develop a plan to implement Force Stabilization concepts into the Army beginning in FY 04. Army-wide implementation will complement a rotation-based system of sustained global


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engagement. This system will also take the Well-Being of Soldiers and families into account. Home-basing will stabilize Soldiers and their families at installations for extended tours. While some Soldiers may be sent on unaccompanied tours, they will then return to their Home-base.

Battle Command capabilities must be leveraged to enable interdependent network-centric warfare, supported by sense-and-respond logistics capabilities, within joint, interagency, and multinational full spectrum operations. The Army must accelerate the Future Force network to enhance the Joint Battle Command capabilities of the Current Force. We must analyze the development of current network architecture and supporting systems. We will re-prioritize development of the Network to focus on top-down fielding to the Current Force. Experiences and lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will be leveraged to enhance Joint Battle Command, including battle command on the move, continuous operations over extended distances, blue force tracking capabilities, and logistics connectivity for select Current Force units. Fielding must be linked to unit rotation plans. The Army will partner with Joint Forces Command in all aspects of network development.

Current to Future Force. Transformation occurs within a context of continuous change.¹² We will provide for the accelerated fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the Current Force. The goal of Army Transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multi-national full spectrum operations. Army transformation occurs within the larger context of continuous change brought about through the interaction of constantly evolving capabilities between Current and Future forces (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Current to Future Force



¹² See Annex C, *The Army Transformation Roadmap*.

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The Current Force is the operational Army today. It is organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations as part of the Joint Force. Designed to provide the requisite warfighting capabilities the Joint Force commander needs across the range of military operations, the Current Force's ability to conduct major combat operations underscores its credibility and effectiveness for full spectrum operations and fulfills the enduring obligation of Army forces to fight wars and win the peace. The Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. Informed by national security and Department of Defense guidance, it is the strategically responsive, precision maneuver force, dominant across the range of military operations envisioned in the future global security environment.

The Army must continue to develop Future Forces while simultaneously spiraling-in Future Force capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the Current Force. In developing the Future Force, three critical challenges must be addressed: (1) the Network (C4ISR architecture); (2) spiral development and field experimentation; and (3) DOTMLPF. The process of identifying and accelerating selected Future Force technologies for fielding to the Current Force will be fundamental to our success in enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army.

Conclusion

Our first priority is clear; we are engaged in a war now. This warfighting mindset is essential and must involve the entire Army. Today's terrorist threat is unprecedented – it is transnational with a vast array of resources and sponsors, including nation states, non-state participants, and narco-terrorist organizations. The Army must adapt its forces to meet the threat. Terrorist organizations have had years to quietly build a worldwide infrastructure. Given the fanatical commitment, asymmetric capabilities, and adaptability of the threat, it is vitally important to defeat our enemies wherever they are found. Adapting our forces to meet the challenges of the GWOT will require a capabilities based, modular, flexible and rapidly employable Joint-Army team, capable of dominating any adversary and controlling any situation across the full range of military operations. A forward deployed Army must be positioned around the world with the right composition and size to provide the maximum flexibility, agility and lethality to conduct operations across the full military spectrum.

Our Nation, the Joint Force, and our Army are engaged in one of the most challenging periods in our history. Failure in the current fight is unthinkable. To defeat the enemies who threaten our freedoms, we cannot remain static, trapped in a web of our own no longer relevant policies, procedures, and processes. Transformation during a time of sustained campaigning will not be easy; but it is a practice that appears many times in the history of our great Army. We must examine, design, and develop new solutions for a new and dangerous world, as we have done so successfully in our past. This will require the deep and personal commitment of every member of the Army team – every leader, every Soldier, every civilian, and every family member.

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ANNEXES

Annex A: National Strategic Guidance

Annex B: Army Strategic Objectives

Annex C: The Army Transformation Roadmap

Annex D: The Security Environment

Annex A: National Strategic Guidance

America's Role in the World

America's role in the world remains critical to regional stability, global economic growth, and the expansion of democratic principles. The U.S. has unrivaled military power, economic interests, and global cultural influence. Our goals in relation to the international community remain expansive but honorable. As the NSS states, America has three goals: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.¹³


U.S. Goals and Methods

The National Security Strategy (NSS) articulates eight methods the U.S. will pursue to achieve its goals. These goals and methods (Figure 4, next page) provide the foundation for the objectives developed in subordinate supporting strategies such as the Defense Strategy (DS) and The Army Plan (TAP). These goals and methods outline what the Department of Defense, and therefore the Army, must accomplish to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives.

While the U.S. has always retained the right under international law to strike preemptively to protect itself from imminent threats, the NSS adapts the concept to account for the capabilities and objectives of rogue states and terrorists willing to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). To support preemptive options to counter the WMD threat the U.S. will build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities; coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The NSS' goals and methods reflect contemporary realities and expand upon the national purpose outlined in the U.S. Constitution. They describe what and how the Nation will advance and defend its interests. The Defense Strategy further refines national level guidance by focusing the goals and methods described in the NSS through a lens optimized for the military instrument of power. A thorough analysis of the NSS and the DS – informed by lessons learned from Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the broader Global War on Terrorism – allows the Army to prepare land forces and capabilities to support and defend the Nation's interests and objectives in conjunction with the other Services, as well as with other government agencies, allies and friends.


¹³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (link valid as of 20 May 2003), p. 1.



Defense Strategy Goals — National Ends

U.S. Defense Strategy seeks to extend America’s influence and prosperity and to preserve America’s security by building a durable framework in which the U.S. and its allies and friends can prosper in freedom (See Figure 5, next page).

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The strategic framework to defend the Nation and secure a viable peace, articulated in the NSS 2002, QDR 2001 and DPG 04-09, is built around four Defense Policy Goals:

- Assuring allies and friends by demonstrating U.S. steadiness of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance common interests, and by strengthening and expanding alliances and security relationships;
- Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening forces or ambitions, shaping the future military competition in ways that are advantageous to the U.S. and complicating the planning and operations of adversaries;
- Deterring aggression and countering coercion against the U.S., its forces, allies and friends in critical areas of the world by developing and maintaining the capability to swiftly defeat attacks with only modest reinforcements; and
- At the direction of the President, decisively defeating any adversary at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing.

Defense Strategic Tenets and Joint Operations Concepts — National Ways

DPG 04-09 identifies seven interconnected Defense Strategic Tenets, which support the four Defense Policy Goals. Current U.S. Defense Strategy is built upon these strategic tenets, which are summarized below. The JOpsC describe how the transformed Joint Force will operate in 15-20 years. Together, these strategic tenets and JOpsC are the ways we achieve the DS' goals of *assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat*, today and in the future.

- Manage risk with respect to preparing for the future while meeting the demands of the present. The new risk framework is made up of four related dimensions: (1) force management risk, (2) operational risk, (3) future risk, and (4) institutional risk;
- Adopt a capabilities-based approach that addresses the uncertain nature of the future threats to the U.S. vital interests or the vital interests of our friends and allies;
- Defend the U.S. and project U.S. military power – to include defense of U.S. land, sea, air, and space approaches;
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships – to include enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, increasing allied participation in joint and combined training and experimentation, and developing new forms of security cooperation;
- Reorient U.S. global military posture by developing an enhanced forward deterrent posture that renders forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcements;
- Develop and maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities to prevail over current challenges and dissuade future threats;
- Transform America's Defense to sustain U.S. military advantages, meet critical operational goals as defined in DPG 04-09, and dominate future military competitions.

The TPG expands upon the DPG's strategic tenet to transform. It identifies the critical elements of transformation, assigns roles and responsibilities for promoting transformation, and describes how DoD will organize to implement transformational capabilities. It also depicts the desired outcome: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace. DoD's overall strategy for implementing transformation consists of three parts:

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- Transformed Culture Through Innovative Leadership that fully implements DoD's transformation strategy and eliminates current practices that stifle innovation.
- Transformed Processes — Risk Adjudication Using Future Operating Concepts to balance the requirements of current operations against the need to invest in capabilities necessary to support future operating concepts.
- Transformed Capabilities Through Force Transformation that rest upon the QDR 2001's four pillars of strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts, and developing transformational capabilities.

Additionally, DoD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) provides further direction to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy and replaces broad-based theater engagement. DoD Security Cooperation involves all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to most effectively advance U.S. security interests and build the right defense partnerships for the future.

Joint Forces and the Force-sizing Construct (1-4-2-1) — National Means

A truly Joint Force is the instrument, or means, we use to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy and achieve its goals. This Joint Force must be interoperable, fully integrated with other instruments of national power, and flexible enough to rapidly respond to challenges and achieve a variety of decisive outcomes. The Joint Force must possess an appropriate mix of critical joint force capabilities and employ quality people to provide the President and Secretary of Defense with a wide variety of options to take decisive action as required.

Over the past decade, military force sizing was based on the strategic requirement to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia (also referred to as the 2 MTW construct). The current U.S. Defense Strategy implements a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning to provide, over time, a richer set of military options across the operational spectrum, offering U.S. forces the means to adapt to any potential surprise and deny asymmetric advantages to adversaries. The force-sizing construct (also referred to as the 1-4-2-1 construct) specifically shapes forces to accomplish the following four missions:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against external attacks (the enduring first priority);
- Deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions: Northeast Asia, East Asian Littoral, Middle East/Southwest Asia and Europe;
- Swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE) of adversaries in two overlapping wars while preserving the President's option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts - including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and

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- Conduct a limited number of lesser contingency operations.

Additionally, the Defense Strategy requires the Services to identify the capabilities necessary to accomplish each of the four missions while maintaining a force generation capability and strategic reserve. In addition to operationalizing the tenets of the DS, this approach also directs DoD components to size military forces based on the above priorities while accounting for improvements in military capability over time. This results in decision-making that either resources all necessary capabilities, or manages risk resulting from under or unresourced capabilities. This force-sizing approach also provides information on high-demand operational and enabling forces, which when compared to current assets, offers insights on low density forces, as well as active and reserve force-mix issues.

The Army's Purpose and Role in National Security

“The Army’s purpose is to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill national military responsibilities.”¹⁴ While we have performed diverse tasks since our establishment in 1775, our nonnegotiable contract with the American people has remained constant: as part of the Joint Force, we are tasked to fight and win our Nation’s wars. To achieve the objectives of the Defense Strategy, the Joint Force synergistically applies its capabilities to decisively defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. In support of the Joint Force, the Army provides versatile, robust, and agile combat forces, capable of operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners.

As the source of “trained and ready land forces capable of decisive action across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict,”¹⁵ the Army must keep these goals and our warfighting focus constantly in mind as we perform our Title 10 functions to organize, train, and equip forces for Joint Force Commanders (JFCs).¹⁶ These forces provide the Combatant Commander critical components to set the conditions for strategic and operational success by ensuring the broadest range of military options in a crisis and by providing the ability to decisively conclude conflict on our terms and timeline. Army forces add to the joint force the power to co-opt and coerce, while also providing the unique ability to control resources and populations. Army combat forces provide the means to impose our will on the enemy and to decisively defeat our Nation’s adversaries.

Conducting major combat operations against a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force. However, resolving such conflict is only one among a myriad of complex undertakings the force may be required to perform. The Joint Force’s core requirement – dominating

¹⁴ FM 1, p. 21.

¹⁵ FM 1, p. iv.

¹⁶ DODD 5100.1, p. 16.

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the full-spectrum of threats and challenges from peace to war – requires the capability and capacity to prevail decisively in combat and at every escalatory step an adversary may take short of war, regardless of geographic location. This dominant capability across the spectrum of conflict also provides the credibility necessary to assure friends, dissuade potential adversaries, and deter current foes.

The Defense Strategy identifies plausible missions for employing forces in the current and emerging security environment. These aims describe the Department of Defense vision for the employment of forces and require the Services to organize, train, and equip forces to fight at multiple levels of warfare. The Joint Force must stand ready to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping major combat operations, and when directed by the President, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those operations. Additionally, the military must retain the ability to conduct contingency operations in other operational scenarios. The Joint Force must have the adaptability to conduct operations ranging from homeland defense to non-combatant operations in distant locations. Finally, the Joint Force must have the ability to source a strategic reserve to sustain operations and achieve decisive outcomes even when operations prove more demanding or prolonged than anticipated. The Army possesses essential capabilities that directly support the Joint Force in achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies by:

- Providing Support Civil Authorities at Home and Abroad. Ground forces provide a broad range of capabilities required to support civil authorities. Whether responding to natural disaster or mitigating the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the homeland, ground forces fulfill a vital security role. Abroad, ground combat forces establish the security conditions necessary for self-sustaining peace in important regions ravaged by conflict. This multiplies the effectiveness of interagency and international community efforts.
- Providing Expeditionary Capabilities to Joint Force Commanders. The Army is forward deployed, strategically responsive, and capable of both forced entry and rapid reinforcement operations. Unique command, control, and logistic capabilities allow Army forces to operate on short notice in diverse, austere, and chaotic environments. These expeditionary capabilities provide an inherent enabler for joint, allied, coalition operations, and interagency coordination.
- Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Reassure Friends, Allies and Coalition Partners. Ground combat forces set the conditions for operational success and assure global access. By their very presence, ground combat forces communicate the strongest signal of America's strategic intentions and commitments. But ground forces offer a value far greater than forward presence alone. Through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and assistance as well as combined exercises with foreign armed forces, Army forces contribute to lasting alliances, coalitions and strategic partnerships.

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- Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Dissuade and Deter Adversaries. The proven ability of our Soldiers contributes immeasurably to the Nation's broader ability to dissuade nation-states and non-state actors tempted to embark upon strategies or to invest in capabilities dangerous to U.S. interests. Though deterrence has proven increasingly difficult in the current security environment, it remains a strategic goal. The ability of ground combat forces to conduct forcible entry by air and sea in the early stages of a crisis, coupled with their unique capability to sustain combat power is a key component of strategic deterrence.
- Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Compel and Decisively Defeat Adversaries Across the Full-Spectrum of Conflict. When deterrence fails, ground combat forces are the decisive element of the Joint Force. Ground forces have the ability to render a decisive outcome by closing with and destroying enemy forces. They have the capability to occupy, seize and control territory, and if necessary, to execute a regime change. This capability allows JFCs to preclude an adversary's options and to compel him to cease hostile action. Ground combat forces are inherently flexible and adaptable. They are ideally suited to conduct Joint Force operations in all types of terrain and weather conditions across the full range of military operations. When committed, ground combat forces have the capability to rob an adversary of initiative and remove their freedom to continue hostilities. Sea, air, and space dominance are invaluable, but only land dominance brings hostilities to a decisive conclusion – establishing and maintaining favorable security conditions for more comprehensive and enduring solutions to complex crises.
- Providing Dominant Land Power Forces and Capabilities Required by Joint Force Commanders to Win the Peace. To achieve enduring victory, U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared, even before hostilities end, to support post-conflict operations as part of an integrated inter-agency effort to begin setting the conditions for security, long-term stability, and sustainable development. This effort must leverage coalition partners, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in order to maximize their unique capabilities and contributions. While post-conflict actions and activities are dominated by diplomatic, economic, and information efforts designed to strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, an integrated political-military plan is vital to enduring success. Although military means alone cannot resolve the underlying social, political, and economic problems that lead to armed conflict, military action can be an effective precursor to achieving a lasting political settlement. The Joint Force must be prepared to transition smoothly from war fighting to maintaining a secure and stable post-hostilities environment that will enable civilian international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to rapidly assume their appropriate roles. Army forces, with their inherent ability to control territory, populations, and resources, may initially be the most effective means available to begin the transition to a stable and sustainable political end-state. The role of the military in a post-conflict environment will vary depending

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on circumstances unique to each conflict. Post-conflict activities may include providing security for U.S. and coalition personnel and humanitarian relief organizations, enabling humanitarian relief and essential services to affected populations, working with international and indigenous organizations to establish law and order, and training and equipping indigenous military and security forces.

- Providing the Nation a Hedge Against Uncertainty. The future security environment is clouded with uncertainty. At the turn of the 20th Century no one foresaw two devastating world wars. Nor did anyone, for that matter, anticipate wars in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. Robust, campaign quality ground forces offer the flexibility required to cope with wars of unexpected intensity and duration, as well as accomplish tasks in support of civil authorities. The value of expandability is even greater in an environment where potential adversaries can, with weapons of mass destruction or effects, cause catastrophic losses.

Annex B: Army Strategic Objectives

As Section I of The Army Plan (TAP), the ASPG serves as the Army's principal planning document, providing the foundation for the development of programs in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The ASPG frames Section II of the TAP – the Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG) – by providing critical information to link resource decisions to Secretary of Defense guidance (e.g., QDR, DPG, etc., collectively referred to as the Defense Strategy or DS) and the Army Senior Leadership's strategic direction. The ASPG identifies the joint demand for capabilities and requirements and provides guidance to the APPG to identify and prioritize the Army's capabilities to meet these requirements. Because resources are limited, this guidance drives the process of prioritizing capabilities in relationship to risk and likelihood of the demand.

Establishing Priorities and Balancing Risk

The ASPG provides priorities for resourcing capabilities and identifying acceptable levels of risk resulting from limiting funding on some needs. Today's strategic planning and prioritization environment is further complicated by the need to balance the near-term operational risk associated with conducting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and other ongoing efforts such as the Balkans, with the Army's responsibilities for mitigating force management risk, institutional risk, and future challenges risk.¹⁷ The Army's policies and programs must be fully consistent with the national security and defense strategic guidance, security objectives and policies. Army policies and programs must also fulfill the current and future operational requirements of combatant commanders (i.e., the joint demand for Army capabilities and forces).¹⁸

Priorities outlined in the ASPG are specific enough to provide clear guidance to TAP Sections II and III – the APPG and the APGM respectively – while remaining broad

¹⁷ The Army's near/mid- and long-term objectives are carefully constructed to appropriately balance the four dimensions of risk identified in the Defense Strategy (operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional risk) within the context of the current and projected strategic and operational environments. The strategic and military risk associated with executing the missions and achieving the goals of the National Security and Defense Strategies is regularly assessed through Periodic Risk Assessment Reports as required by the Joint Risk Assessment System. Operational Risk is the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Future Challenges Risk is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid-to long-term military challenges. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. Institutional Risk is the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operations of the Defense establishment.

¹⁸ Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.1: *Functions of The Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 1 August 2002, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/51001.htm> (link valid as of 1May 2003), p. 13.

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enough to allow the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and requirements. First and foremost, we must win the current fight and sustain the War on Terrorism. This requires giving priority to capabilities that enhance the relevance and readiness of our Army to the Joint Team today and throughout the next decade. We must ensure the Army is fully prepared, trained and equipped for the current operational environment. We will identify and selectively accelerate key capabilities and technologies from the Future Force and spiral them into the Current Force to enhance its capability. We will provide for the Soldiers who man our Army so they can dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. As we move toward Future Force capabilities, we must not permit gaps to appear in the near-term capabilities of the Joint Force on the expectation that these gaps will be addressed at some future point. We must also seek Joint solutions and provide essential capabilities to the Joint Force Commander. We must rethink our organizations, processes, culture, and institutions to develop and support a more modular, capabilities-based, strategically responsive force inculcated with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.

Balancing risk is a dynamic process. After a thorough analysis of the strategic environment, national guidance, and operational requirements, we have identified a number of immediate Focus Areas. These Focus Areas represent opportunities to rebalance risk and enhance the relevance and readiness of the force. The Focus Areas provide specific guidance for planning, preparation, and execution of actions aimed at rapidly affecting necessary and positive change. They constitute changes to existing near- and mid-term guidance and are not intended to be all-inclusive.¹⁹ In many instances, actions are called for that must be executed or initiated inside the 06-11 POM Cycle. The Army Strategic Objectives necessary for prioritizing and programming purposes within the normal timeline associated with the TAP are defined later in this Annex within the framework of the Strategic Readiness System.²⁰

Immediate Focus Areas

The Soldier. Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army and Army forces. Flexible, adaptive and competent Soldiers infused with the Army's Warrior Culture fight wars and

¹⁹ For the purposes of The Army Plan, the following definitions are used: Near-term is within the Budget Year; Mid-Term is within the POM cycle; Long-Term is beyond the POM cycle..

²⁰ The Strategic Readiness System assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach – a process analogous to METL development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies and essential and enduring capabilities, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and forecast strategic performance. The Army Strategy Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives. The SRS will identify for senior leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that The Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its enduring mission for the nation.

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win the peace. The human dimension of Army Transformation remains the crucial link to the realization of Future Force capabilities and enhanced effectiveness of Current Forces. Systems, technologies, platforms and organizations with Soldiers at the center, empower them for decisive outcomes in joint operations. Families and DA Civilians are integral components of the Army. To further these efforts we will treat the Soldier as a System (SaaS) and modernize all deploying and to be deployed Soldiers, civilians and contractors. In June 2003, Warrior Ethos was redefined. Recent performance in combat by some units prompted a thorough review of Warrior Ethos and development of an implementation strategy for the entire Army. Further, the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) has yielded new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that must be rapidly integrated, resourced and trained. In order to ensure all soldiers (including DA civilians) deploying into an Area of Operations have the proper equipment, Rapid Fielding Initiatives (RFI) were expanded in FY 04. As a result, we will reexamine and synchronize the RFI plan with the rotation plan and other SaaS programs. We will reexamine and determine requirements for individual and collective training. We will inculcate Warrior Ethos in all Soldiers. Finally, we will focus on developing situational awareness before, during and after deployments. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Train the Army (P5); Equip the Army (P6); Leverage Technologies into Key Processes and Equip the Army (P9); Pride and Sense of Belonging (L3); and Personal Enrichment (L4). The lead for this effort is Task Force Soldier (CG, US Army Infantry School) with support from AMC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, HQDA, USAAC, USMA, USASMA, PEO Soldier, Natick Labs, USARC, NGB, ASA and ARI.

The Bench. We must build a bench of leaders who think strategically and innovatively at all levels of war -- leaders who are self-aware and adaptive and who operate seamlessly in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. TF Bench will determine how to identify, prepare, and assign select Army leaders into key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and service organizations. Additionally, TF Bench will examine how to institutionalize systems required to sustain such assignments. This focus area supports several Strategic Objectives to include: L5 - Leader training and leader development, and P1- Ready force for today and tomorrow. The lead for this effort is the U.S. Army War College with support from various organizations and agencies to include CAC, DAS, G-1, ASA(M&RA), and NDU.

The Network. Concepts such as Network Centric Warfare, Full Spectrum Dominance, and Decision Superiority are impossible to achieve without a robust, modular, deployable, and always capable Network. This network is more than information systems. It consists of individuals and systems located across the entire spectrum of the battlefield framework. That framework stretches from the individual soldier on point, through the variety of operations centers in the theater of operation, and stretches back to the Home Station Operation Center regardless of where its at. Our focus will shift from a bottom up approach to one that focuses systems from a top down approach. Task Force Network will analyze current Network(s) from a top-down perspective, and develop recommendations in collaboration with Joint/OSD community

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to increase Battle Command capability for the Current and Future Forces in Joint, Interagency, and Multi-national (JIM) full-spectrum operations. The Task Force will identify baseline capabilities required by the Army to be relevant in a JIM environment. TF Network will recommend a single Army lead for network development, and a re-prioritization of network developments that will accelerate the Future Combat Systems Network and improve Current Force capabilities. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Execute Prompt Response (C2); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Equip the Army (P6); and Communicate across the Army (P12). The lead for this effort is the Signal Center, Fort Gordon, GA, with support from various organizations and agencies including: HQDA (G3, G6), PEO-C3T, NETCOM, USAF, USMC, CASCOM, Intel Center, TRADOC AIMD, SMDC, DISA, TSM WIN-T, TSM TR, Battle Lab (Gordon).

Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. We must develop a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset that embraces requirements for modular, capabilities based Army forces to achieve joint interdependence in support of Combatant Commander requirements. We will review training requirements, traditional relationships, and developmental and institutional programs that must change to embed this mindset into the total force. We will develop an action plan to cultivate a joint and expeditionary mindset through changed organizational and institutional behavior. We will propose a new joint logistics concept. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Shape the Security Environment (C1); Execute Prompt Response (C2); Mobilize the Army (C3); Conduct Forcible Entry (C4); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Support Civil Authorities (C6); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Sustain the Army (P2); Organize the Army (P3); Man the Army (P4); Train the Army (P5); Equip the Army (P6); Communicate Across the Army (P12); Opportunity for Service (L1); Competitive Standard of Living (L2); Pride and Sense of Belonging (L3); Personal Enrichment (L4); and Training and Leader Development (L5). The lead for this effort is TRADOC Task Force JEM, with support from HQDA, AMC, CAC, USAWC, SWC, and CASCOM.

AC/RC Balance. We must develop force structure options to have a modular Army with a proper AC/RC mix. The objective is to reduce involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the first 15 days of an operation and predictably deploy reserve component forces not more than one year in six. We will reexamine our roles, missions, and organizational force mix and develop action plans for a restructured force with appropriate AC/RC mix across the full strategy and force-sizing construct. We will develop plans for ALO 1 Active Army units and select Reserve Component units, and address near term solutions for improving the readiness and deployability of existing organizations. We will develop plans for TTHS structures for the ARNG and USAR. Additionally, analysis will explore the use of smaller RC packages to provide depth to AC structure. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Shape the Security Environment (C1); Execute Prompt Response (C2); Mobilize the Army (C3); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Organize the Army (P3); and Man the Army (P4). The lead for this effort is G-3, with support from M & RA, G-8, FORSCOM, DARNG, and OCAR.

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Modularity. The Army must restructure to more modular, capabilities-based forces to better meet Combatant Commanders' requirements. The Army will continue to support operational deployments/rotations while assuming additional missions as needed for our Nation at war. Changing the organizational structure of units must be logically consistent with future force concepts but tempered by the technological capabilities that are reasonably available within the near term. To accomplish this, brigade combat teams will be restructured into Brigade Units of Action as the basic maneuver module for Army forces. Once transitioned, BUAs will enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive, sustained employment to support Combatant Commanders. BUAs will also enhance the expeditionary/campaign quality of Army forces by better enabling joint-coalition operations. The transition to BUAs will also increase the brigade equivalent forces available to meet both enduring and emerging mission requirements. The transition will include heavy and light forces redesigns that are synchronized with unit rotations. Ultimately, all active divisions, echelons above division/corps and Army National Guard eSBs will reorganize in conjunction with unit rotations. Task Force will also redesign Division and Corps Headquarters with inherently joint capabilities to employ Brigade Units of Action. The implementation plan will reflect what is possible today and serve as steps in transitioning to the Future Force. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Readiness System (SRS) Objectives, including Execute Prompt Response (C2); Mobilize the Army (C3); Conduct Forcible Entry (C4); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Sustain the Army (P2); Organize the Army (P3); Equip the Army (P6); Leverage Technology into Key Processes and Equipping the Future Army (P9). The lead for this effort is TRADOC Task Force Modularity, with support from Futures Center, HQDA, CAC, TRAC, CASCOM, AWC, AMC, FORSCOM, OCAR, NGB, USAF, USN, and USMC.

Force Stabilization. The Army is transitioning to an improved manning system that places greater emphasis on building and sustaining cohesive, deployable combat-ready units for Combatant Commanders. Unit Focused Stability and Home-basing are two initiatives, among others, that will contribute to Force Stabilization. Unit Focused Stability addresses the primary objective of Force Stabilization – fostering more cohesive, combat ready forces. This initiative synchronizes Soldier assignments to unit operational cycles, setting the conditions for achieving higher levels of training effectiveness, deployability and readiness. With Home-basing, Soldiers and their families will be assigned at an installation for extended initial tours. This will stabilize Soldiers in their units and reduce unit turbulence. Force Stabilization will enable units to be more agile and deployable, complementing and enhancing our Joint and Expeditionary Mindset (JEM) and rotation-based environment. All relevant policies, procedures and regulations are being adjusted to ensure a successful transition from an individual-centric to a unit-centric environment. This Focus area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Execute Prompt Response (C2); Mobilize the Army (C3); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Organize the Army (P3); and Man the Army (P4). The HQDA lead for this effort is G-1, with support from the ASA (MR&A), and synchronized to G-8 (Unit Set Fielding) and G-3 (Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy).

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Combat Training Center/BCTP. The Army's CTCs (NTC, JRTC, CMTTC, BCTP) will become joint centric and remain an "engine of change" for the current and future Army. The primary purpose of the CTCs is to develop self-aware, adaptive leaders and ready units for full-spectrum, Joint, Interagency, Multinational (JIM) operations. CTCs will accomplish this by integrating a contemporary and joint operational environment (COE/JOE) into all training. This environment will include: simultaneous, non-contiguous, and continuous operations in a distributed, global, live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) environment under a JIM context. Army units will get a rigorous fight in the COE including offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of modular formations against an unpredictable OPFOR. The battlefield will be arrayed in depth to maximize stress on digital C4ISR systems. Complex terrain including MOUT operations will be a part of each rotation. Instrumented feedback for both formal and informal AARs will provide the necessary lessons learned for leaders, units, and the Army at large. SOF operations will be integrated throughout the rotation as well as realistic CSS play to stress the logistics structure. Deployment training will remain a paramount aspect of CTC training to include realistic TPFDD flow. The Army fully supports the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) where joint integration will become the norm. Finally, expanding global reach of the CTCs will be necessary to rapidly respond to future training challenges to support units preparing for or in combat. As a result, the Army will explore exportable CTC capability with deployable instrumentation and AAR enablers to support a joint expeditionary mindset. The CTC Program directly supports both SRS Core Competencies to: Provide Relevant & Ready Land Power Capability to the Combatant Commander & Joint Team as well as Train Soldiers and Grow Leaders. It further supports Strategic Objectives P1 (Ready Forces for Today and Tomorrow); P3 (Train the Army); and L5 (Leader Training and Leader Development).

Leader Development and Education. The Army's current leader development process has served the Army and the Nation well as evidenced by recent operations. To remain relevant, the Army's leader development and education system must train, educate, and grow Army leaders that are the centerpiece of a campaign quality Army with a joint expeditionary mindset. Leader development is accomplished in three domains - operational, institutional, and self-development. In the operational domain, leader development is accomplished by leaders in units through individual and collective training, assessment, and feedback. The institutional domain provides standards based training and education that develops Army leaders grounded in an ethos of service to the Nation, instilled with a warrior ethos, that have a common doctrinal foundation, are self-aware, innovative, and adaptive, capable of successfully operating as part of a Joint, Interagency, Multi-national (JIM) team in full spectrum operations within the contemporary operational environment. The institutional domain provides training on common Soldier tasks, selected critical technical and tactical tasks, and facilitates self-development through leveraging educational and informational technologies to develop and maintain, distribute and provide access to training and educational materials for individual Soldier and unit use. The institutional domain builds on leaders' operational experiences and enables life long learning through resident and non-resident schooling at Army, Joint and civilian schools using live-virtual-constructive training domains as a

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foundation for experiential learning to meet Army requirements. To further strengthen the institutional domain, the Task Force will develop a strategy for management and accreditation of non-TRADOC schools. Self-development is the third domain of leader development and an essential component of life-long learning. Self-development is a standards-based, feedback-driven, structured program of activities and learning that contributes to professional competence, organizational effectiveness, and professional development. Individual and organizational assessment and feedback programs in the operational and institutional domains, linked to developmental actions, grow competent and confident leaders and trained and ready organizations and units. Developing Army leaders to meet the needs of the Army and the Nation requires agile and innovative leader development and education systems. In order to accomplish this task, the Task Force will review and prioritize recommendations of Army Training Leader Development (ATLDP) panels and develop an implementation strategy. The Lead for this effort is DA G3 with support from G-8, DANG, and OCAR. Linkages to SRS - Army Core Competencies - Train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders and provide relevant and ready land power capability; L3 Pride and sense of belonging; L5 - Leader training and leader development; P1- Ready force for today and tomorrow; P5 - Train the Army; P8 Improve business practices; P9 Leverage technologies into key processes.

Army Aviation. Army Aviation will become a modular, capabilities-based maneuver arm with a reduced logistics tail optimized for the joint fight. We will review and adjust the Army Aviation Modernization and Transformation plans for jointness, feasibility and affordability. Focusing on improving capabilities now and in the future, fielded aviation systems, those in development and special operation forces initiatives will be assessed for relevancy and applicability. AC/RC organizations will be structured to execute Defense Planning Guidance by aligning the force based on the task purpose of the formations and structuring RC aviation to be more responsive to Swiftly Defeat the Enemy (SDTE) / Win Decisively (WD) strategies. The result will be a plan that synchronizes the structure to flow toward the future force and establishes a strategy to accelerate or divest current initiatives as required. The Army Aviation Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Readiness System (SRS) Objectives, including Execute Prompt Response (C2); Mobilize the Army (C3); Conduct Forcible Entry (C4); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Support Civil Authorities (C6); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1); Sustain the Army (P2); Organize the Army (P3); Man the Army (P4); Train the Army (P5); Equip the Army (P6). TRADOC is the lead agency for this effort with assistance from HQDA, ARSOA, NGB, OCAR, AMC, PEO Aviation as well as Combined Arms Schools and Centers.

Installations as Our Flagships. Our installations must be resourced to serve as our flagships, able to project power, support tough realistic training, and provide for Soldiers, families, and civilians. We will focus our short term planning strategies on four essential tasks: (1) Posturing installations as Power Projection Platforms with robust reach-back capabilities; (2) Adjusting installation support to meet the needs of an Army at war; and (3) Supporting well-being of all Soldiers and their families. Long term focus will center on making installations quality Information Hubs, Combat Preparation and Sustainment Support Centers, Deployment Platforms, Secure Sanctuaries, and Holistic

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Communities. Restoration and modernization will extend well beyond the POM years to enable the Army to simultaneously integrate installation plans and programs with Army modernization and force stationing while implementing the rotation-based system of global engagement. This focus area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including C2 "Execute Prompt Response;" C3 "Mobilize the Army;" C6 "Support Civil Authorities;" and P7 "Provide Infrastructure." The co-leads for this effort are ASA (I&E) and ACSIM.

Current to Future Force. We must frame Army Transformation within the context of constant change to provide relevant and ready Current and Future Forces organized, trained and equipped for joint, interagency and multinational full spectrum operations. We will accelerate implementation of select Future Force capabilities to enable the enhancement of the Current Force (Future to Current), improve the implementation of lessons learned from operational experiences (Current to Current), and extend the application of proven ideas, lessons learned and selected capabilities from the current force into the future (Current to Future). We will do this by examining opportunities for changing processes that can facilitate this intent. We will nest Army transformation within Joint transformation and the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) and review current transformation documents and guidance for synchronization with the CSA's intent for change. We will generate flexibility for spiraling future force capabilities into the current force by reviewing the FCS contracts and acquisition approach. The Army will implement appropriate recommendations of the Welch Panel. The Current to Future focus area supports both Army Core Competencies and impacts a number of internal processes including Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1), Sustain the Army (P2), Organize the Army (P3), Train the Army (P6), Provide Infrastructure (P7), Improve Business Practice (P8), Leverage Technologies into Key Processes and Equip the Army (P9), Improve Acquisition with Industries (P11). The lead for this effort is TRADOC with support from RDECOM, G3 ATO, ASA(ALT), CASCOM, G8, JFCOM and DARPA. Additional collaborators include the other focus area Task Forces, FORSCOM, DOE, OFTF, USMC, PM FCS, AMC, ARNG/USAR and G4.

Resource Processes. The Army will provide resource processes that are flexible, responsive, and accelerated to support an Army at war. The Army will leverage the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (The Army Plan Section I) as a mechanism to develop a concise Army Vision nested within Joint Guidance. The Army will align with the new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS- CJCSI 3170.01c) under the context provided in the Joint Capabilities Development Process (Aldridge Study). Key tasks include (1) align and nest Army resource processes within the overarching DoD PPBE, (2) provide "fast track" responsive resourcing of emerging Joint fight requirements to support Combatant Commanders, and (3) develop a joint strategy to embed transparency across the DoD PPBE process in order to best-match scarce resources to "born-joint" capabilities earlier in the resourcing process – focused on providing responsiveness and flexibility to meet urgent out of cycle needs at any time. This effort supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including P1 "Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow;" P6 "Equip the Army;" P11 "Improve Acquisition with

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Industry;” and P8 “Improve Business Practices.” Lead for this Focus Area is the Director of the Army Staff.

Strategic Communications. The Strategic Communications organization at the Executive Headquarters of the Army is established to develop, synchronize and disseminate strategic themes, messages, and talking points to internal and external audiences. A key StratComms objective is to engage opinion leaders and decision makers and build strong relationships. To meet its mission, the organization is collaborative, strategically focused, effects based and product oriented. Overarching themes and messages reflect the strategic context, DoD/JS directions, public affairs objectives, and legislative priorities. Messages are adjusted to meet changes in the contemporary operating environment. The desired effect is to engage a wide range of audiences in a proactive manner, and gain support and understanding for the Army's relevance and direction. Products include strat comm plans, communications materials, outreach events, anticipated issues, and communications mechanisms (including Army Web page and the Army Senior Leader Page). This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives including Shape the Security Environment (C1); Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow (P1). The lead for this effort is EOH Strategic Communications.

Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability. The Army's authority is derived from the authority granted the Presidentially appointed Secretary by the Constitution, the United States Code, and other foundational documents of the United States. The Army further divides that authority in effective ways to accomplish the myriad of missions and institutional responsibilities assigned by the President, the Secretary of Defense and other higher authorities. We must examine the balance of ensuring compliance with the laws of the nation and proper civilian control of the Army with the need for commanders and supervisors at every level to be given the appropriate authorities to accomplish their missions and functions in agile, flexible ways, while at the same time developing and exercising the necessary means to ensure accountability for results. Clarifying authorities and fixing accountability is an enabling operation that affects accomplishment of all Army objectives. This will make the Army more effective, agile and able to produce and employ its unique capabilities ever more quickly. The Army must integrate its resourcing system metrics with its results metrics, and provide leaders at all levels the information needed to make fact-based decisions on reliable data and thorough analysis. The Army's measures of results must be meaningful to the Joint Staff and must measure capabilities important to combatant commanders, our senior leaders, and stakeholders in OSD and the other services. A steering group chaired by the Director of the Army Staff will conduct an Army wide examination to establish the proper balance of responsibility and authority, which will strengthen the SRS and other accountability systems and processes. The goal is to improve the Army's ability to accomplish its many missions. Lead for this Focus area is the Director of the Army Staff.


Actionable Intelligence. Redefine intelligence, instilling an Army-wide culture and mindset that every soldier is a collector in learning, adaptive organizations that leverage inherent intelligence capabilities. Rapidly implement a system that provides intelligence

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to commanders with the speed, accuracy and confidence to impact current and future operations (actionable intelligence). Replace a stovepiped Cold War intelligence structure with universal access to shared databases, advanced analytical tools, knowledge centers and sensors/collectors, interdependent with theater, joint and national intelligence organizations. This Focus Area supports a number of Strategic Objectives, including Shape the Security Environment (C1); Execute Prompt Response (C2); Conduct Forcible Entry (C4); Sustained Land Dominance (C5); Support Civil Authorities (C6); Organize the Army (P3); Train the Army (P5); Equip the Army (P6); Provide Infrastructure (P7); Communicate Across the Army (P12); Leverage Technology into Key Processes and Equipping the Future Army (P9); and Leader Training & Leader Development (L5). The lead for this effort is G-2 with support from G-3, G-8, TRADOC, INSCOM, and USASOC.

The Strategic Readiness System

The Strategic Readiness System (SRS) is the framework The Army has adopted to transform into a **strategy-focused organization** based on Balanced Scorecard Methodology. It is not intended to make The Army a business, but rather to ensure that we establish a clear linkage between our strategic objectives and our actions and decisions. The heart of SRS is establishment of strategic *objectives* (ends), development of *initiatives* (ways) to meet those objectives, and *measures* to predict future performance while monitoring past execution. *Targets* for measures inform leaders how well the initiatives are working and act as decision points for strategic decisions involving *resources* (means). Figure 6, displays the Army Strategy Map. This annex identifies Strategic Objectives for the SRS and provides supporting objectives with links to Army initiatives underway to achieve these objectives.



The SRS assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach – a process analogous to METL development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires

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organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and *forecast* strategic performance. The Army Strategy Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives described in this annex. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives.²¹ The SRS will identify for senior leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that the Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its enduring mission for the nation. Finally, the SRS enables the Army's senior leaders to improve the accountability of the Army for its forecast results, and make adjustments as necessary, in resources, personnel assignments, and policy direction.

Essential and Enduring Capabilities: Support Both Army Core Competencies and are linked to Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) and desired Joint capabilities

C1-Shape Security Environment - Cooperate with foreign militaries to assure allies and friends, dissuade threats to US national interests, deter conflict and enhance prompt, effective, multi-national response capabilities. (Supports JOC: Strategic Deterrence)

Supporting Objectives:

- Build defense relationships that promote specific US interests - assuring allies of American security commitments and improving cooperation between the U.S. Army and foreign governments and militaries.
- Develop and enhance allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense, coalition operations, interoperability and transformation.
- Provide US forces with peacetime or contingency access and en route infrastructure; support access to overseas training areas, transit and storage facilities, and services.
- Forward-station Army forces and capabilities that enhance regional deterrence and provide responsive support to combatant commanders.

Supporting Initiatives: Army International Activities Plan (AIAP); Partnership for Peace; Defense Language Program; Defense Standardization Program; Joint & Army Exercise Program; Army Special Operations Forces Transformation; AMEDD Transformation; Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS); Information Operations Campaign Plan (IOCP).

²¹ The development and articulation of the Army's Strategic Objectives is a dynamic and ongoing process. Strategic Objectives are not, and are not intended to be, static and unchanging. They will be periodically updated.

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Focus Area Linkage: Actionable Intelligence, AC/RC Balance, Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, Strategic Communications.

C2-Execute Prompt Response - Provide strategically responsive land forces required by the Joint Force Commander that can be mission-tailored, projected from home or abroad, and conduct decisive operations immediately to deter or decisively defeat adversaries. (Supports JOCs: Major Combat Operations and Stability Operations).

Supporting Objectives:

- Maintain forward presence forces in critical regions to provide responsive support to Regional Combatant Commanders. (Implement Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, 2004-2010)
- Maintain equipment sets ashore and afloat in critical regions to provide responsive support to Regional Combatant Commanders. Reconfigure and modernize APS equipment by FY06. Integrate SBCT equipment (mid-term objective) and UA equipment (long-term) as appropriate.
- Achieve Army deployment objectives with Joint support in accordance with SecDef's Joint Swiftness Objectives as outlined in Operational Availability Action Items Memo, 18 August 2003.
- Work with USAF and Joint staff to enhance strategic and intra-theater capabilities: C-17, C-130J, super-short take-off and landing (SSTOL) and heavy lift vertical take-off and landing (HLVTOL) aircraft options that deliver Army combat formations and sustainment forward in the battlespace and into austere environments). Further develop and refine the Army's organic intra-theater airlift capability.
- Establish Army capability for Intra-theater Sealift in two MCOs to transport an SBCT equivalent unit 625 NM to meet SecDef Joint Swiftness Objectives and Regional Combatant Commanders' prompt response requirements.
- Establish integrated logistics enterprise that provides end-to-end warfighter support. Improve theater distribution, force reception, and enhanced aerial resupply capabilities.

Supporting Initiatives: Army Power Projection Program (AP3); Army Prepositioned Set (APS) Strategy; Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS); Army Transformation Concept Development Experimentation Plan (AT-CDEP); Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI); Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRR); Army Logistics Transformation; Aviation Transformation; AMEDD Transformation; Reserve Component Training Strategy; Army Partnerships; IOCP.

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Focus Area Linkage: Modularity; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; AC/RC Balance; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; Installations as Flagships; Current to Future Force; The Soldier; The Network, Actionable Intelligence.

C3-Mobilize the Army - Maintain the ability to mobilize land forces to meet crises, including protracted, major theater war and provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with the means to confront unforeseen challenges. (Supports JOCs: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations).

Supporting Objectives:

- Provide Power Projection Platforms/Power Support Platforms with critical CONUS support base augmentation and garrison support units capable of meeting throughput requirements to simultaneously support two major combat operations less than 30 days apart in accordance with the 10-30-30 construct and other Army commitments.
- Improve efficiency of mobilization and demobilization processes and align mobilization categories (PRC, Partial, and Full) to Defense Planning Guidance Force Sizing Construct (1-4-2-1).
- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation).
- AR & ARNG units/soldiers arrive at mobilization or duty stations within 72 hours of notification, P-1 with qualified leaders, and requiring minimal post-mobilization training. Transition to Train/Alert/Deploy model.
- Establish and maintain a force deployment capability for enduring operations based upon a rotational ratio of 4:1 (rule of 5) for active forces. Structure reserve forces to limit involuntary mobilizations to no more than one year in every six.
- Establish mobilization training and force validation through the FORSCOM collective training structure and TRADOC individual training structures to ensure rapid, effective, and sustained mobilization.

Supporting Initiatives: Power Projection Studies; Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI); Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRRI); Mobilization/Demobilization Studies; Operational Availability Studies; IMA; Army Power Projection Program (AP3); AMEDD Transformation; AMOPES and FORMDEPS revision; Training Support Future Force; IOCP.

Focus Area Linkage: Modularity; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; AC/RC Balance; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; Installations as Flagships; Current to Future Force.

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C4-Conduct Forcible Entry - Apply land combat power at the point of decision to gain entry into contested areas worldwide with land forces that are able to fight upon arrival, defeat anti-access and area denial threats and prepare for arrival of follow-on forces. (Supports JOCs: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations).

Supporting Objectives:

- Posture Army brigade level forcible entry capabilities (airborne, SBCT, etc.) forward to support global commitments and Regional Combatant Commander requirements.
- Provide Army brigade combat teams organized, resourced, and stationed to execute deployment from strategic distances into a contested area and employ required level of combat power in a forced entry operation.
- Enhance capabilities of Army special operations/special purpose units organized and resourced to conduct strike operations in support of forced entry operations to include Ranger, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Airborne, headquarters, and support units.

Supporting Initiatives: Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS); SOF Transformation; Army Power Projection Program (AP3); IOCP.

Focus Area Linkage: Modularity; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; AC/RC Balance; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; Installations as Flagships; Current to Future Force, Actionable Intelligence.

C5-Sustained Land Dominance - Provide full spectrum maneuver forces for the full range of military operations in the 21st Century including: conducting operational maneuver from strategic distances and mobile strike operations; closing with and destroying enemy forces; applying precision fires and maneuver; exercising information superiority; commanding and controlling joint and multi-national forces; and controlling and defending land, people, and resources at home and abroad. (Supports JOCs: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations).

Supporting Objectives:

- Provide sufficient combat and support forces, trained and available for deployment to execute one swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE) or limited objective campaign at moderate risk and one SDTE elevated to a win-decisive operation at minimum risk.
- Provide tailorable, and highly deployable division, corps, and ASCC headquarters capable of operating in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment as JTF, JFLCC, and ARFOR headquarters.

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- Develop standardized battle command capabilities and ensure interoperability of equipment and systems with joint and combined forces.
- Provide integrated air and missile defense system to counter an increasing land attack cruise missile and theater ballistic missile threat.
- Provide modernized theater distribution, integrated logistics aerial resupply capabilities, improved force reception capabilities, integrated supply chain, and sense and respond logistics capabilities.
- Shape the information environment by ensuring availability of required information and information systems.

Supporting Initiatives: Command Post Standardization; Army Battle Command System Way Ahead; Patriot Modernization; Army Interoperability Strategy / Plan; AGRI; FRR1; ARSOF Transformation; Logistics Transformation and Army Logistics Transformation Workgroup; AMEDD Transformation; Ground-based Air and Missile Defense; Unit Set Fielding; Software Blocking; IOCP.

Focus Area Linkage: The Soldier; The Bench; The Network; Modularity; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; AC/RC Balance; CTCs and BCTP; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; Installations as Flagships; Current to Future Force, Actionable Intelligence.

C6-Support Civil Authorities - Provide the diversity of services and support that the Army can uniquely contribute to assist civil authorities in domestic contingencies, including disaster relief and crisis resolution, until the civil authority reestablishes control or civilian relief agencies can assume the mission. (Supports JOC: Homeland Security).

Supporting Objectives:

- Improve crisis management and incident response capabilities for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE).
- Support NORTHCOM and PACOM with planning/coordination capabilities, supporting headquarters, and forces to execute homeland defense and military support to civil authorities.
- Improve RC capabilities and dual-purpose force structure for HLS/HLD/CS.

Supporting Initiatives: Single CBRNE Headquarters; WMD-CSTs; BIDS Companies; Ground Missile Defense; AGRI; AMEDD Transformation; Aviation Transformation; IOCP.

Focus Area Linkage: AC/RC Balance, Actionable Intelligence.

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Internal Processes - Readiness and Transformation: Support the accomplishment of all essential capabilities.

P1-Ready Force for Today and Tomorrow - Army executes Title 10/32 functions to provide trained and ready units to the Combatant Commanders to execute the National Security and Defense Strategies. Develop and implement readiness objectives for Soldiers and units in the transforming Army.

Supporting Objectives:

- Maintain a full spectrum joint and expeditionary capable force package that minimizes RC mobilization for the first 15 days of an SDTE operation.
- Remaining RC and AC forces meet required Army readiness objectives.

Supporting Initiatives: Strategic Readiness System Implementation; AGRI; FRRI; Total Army Analysis 06-11; Training Transformation; Flight School XXI (FSXXI); Joint National Training Capability; Army Digital Training Strategy (ADTS); AMEDD Transformation.

Focus Area Linkage: Soldier, Joint and Expeditionary Mindset, Force Stabilization, Modularity, AC/RC Balance.

P2-Sustain The Army - Maintain and replenish stocks and equipment to successfully execute The Army Plan and the Transformation Campaign Plan.

Supporting Objectives:

- Reduced logistics support footprint and enhanced battlefield distribution/sustainment through improved processes and IT applications; two level maintenance; and modular force structure.
- Integrate industrial base considerations into logistics planning and support. Develop capability to ensure core maintenance capabilities are available with the organic base.
- Maintain required operational readiness rates for designated Current Force and Future Force systems.
- Maintain sufficient availability of ammunition/munitions to support Current Force and Future Force weapons platforms.

Supporting Initiatives: Logistics Transformation; Ammunition Studies; SRS; Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI); Rapid Equipping Force (REF); Spiral Development Process; AMEDD Transformation.

Focus Area Linkage: The Soldier; Current to Future Force; Army Aviation; Resource Processes.

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P3-Organize The Army - Establish and implement force structure requirements driven by the Army concepts to include the operating and generating Forces.

Supporting Objectives:

- Provide Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and Generating Forces consistent with the Defense Planning Guidance 1-4-2-1 Force-Sizing Construct and the lessons learned from OEF, OIF, and the GWOT.
- Reorganize the Army into smaller, lethal, deployable, full-spectrum brigades with stand-alone modular command and control at echelons above brigade.
- Build depth to maintain sufficient numbers of units to support a goal of 4:1 (Rule of 5) for active forces and sufficient reserve forces to limit involuntary mobilizations to no more than one year in every six for forward presence and stability operations.
- Reduce USAR and ARNG over-structure and readiness shortfalls by balancing endstrength and force structure allowance, and create a TTHS account for the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.
- Improve Active, USAR, and ARNG (AC-RC) balance to better support full spectrum operations.
- Attain initial operational capability for five active component Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) (including one Stryker Cavalry Regiment) by 2007. The reserve component SBCT (PAARNG) is operational by 2010.
- Achieve first Future Force Unit of Action (UA) (-) IOC in 2010 with full operational capability in 2012. Second UA and first Unit of Employment IOC by 2013. Beginning in 2014, achieve IOC for 2 UAs per year.
- Achieve initial operational capability for first ARNG Mobile Light Brigade (MLB) by 2011.

Supporting Initiatives: Total Army Analysis 06–11 Operating and Generating Force Requirements and Resourcing; AGRI; FRRI; UA and UE Fielding/Stationing Plans; Logistics Transformation; Personnel Transformation; AMEDD Transformation.

Focus Area Linkage: Modularity; Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; AC/RC Balance; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; Current to Future Force, Actionable Intelligence.

P4-Man The Army - Develop and maintain programs and policies to man the Army with Soldiers and civilian employees. Raise and sustain a quality force that enhances readiness and strengthens the Army as an institution.

Supporting Objectives:

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- Fully man MTOE and critical TDA units; required = authorized.
- Fully implement Unit Focused Stability plans.

Supporting Initiatives: Unit Focused Stability, Unit Rotation; Personnel Transformation, Military to Civilian Conversions, FRR1; AGRI; TAA 06-11 Operating and Generating Force Requirements and Resourcing.

Focus Area Linkage: Modularity; AC/RC Balance; Force Stabilization; Army Aviation; The Bench; The Soldier.

P5-Train The Army - Provide trained forces to combatant commanders. Maintain capability to train Soldiers, leaders, and units.

Supporting Objectives:

- Train Army forces for full-spectrum operations through rigorous live/virtual/constructive training at home-station and Combat Training Centers.
- Transform the Army's training capability to focus on the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational environment

Supporting Initiatives: Joint National Training Capability; Training Transformation (T2) – OES; NCOES; WOES; Training Resource Model; Flight School XXI; FM 7-1 Revision; FRR1; Reserve Mobilization Requirements Study; Digital Training Strategy, Civilian Leader Development and Education; RC Training Strategy Revision; Army Collective Training Strategy.

Focus Area Linkage: Leader Development and Education, Soldier, CTC/BCTP, Joint and Expeditionary Mindset; The Bench; The Soldier, Actionable Intelligence.

P6 - Equip The Army - The Army provides fully equipped and modernized forces to execute Army's core competencies.

Supporting Objectives:

- Field available Future Force capabilities to the Current Force. Develop capabilities consistent with Joint Interdependence and conducting operations in a Joint, Interagency, and Multinational environment.
- Recapitalize the Current Force, to include RC forces.
- Develop and maintain resourcing programs to equip selected ALO 1 units at a required = authorized level with critical equipment and materiel needed to execute assigned missions.
- Field Stryker, Future Combat Systems, and other systems by unit set fielding to meet established SBCT and UA IOC timelines.

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- Modernize two current force divisions, ACR, selected units in the digitized corps, and ARSOF.

Supporting Initiatives: Unit Set Fielding Plans – Future Combat Systems; Stryker Brigade Combat Teams; Recapitalization Plans; Unit Focused Stability & Rotation; AMC restructure; AMEDD Transformation, Battle Command; Land Warrior; Rapid Fielding Initiative; Rapid Equipping Force; Software Blocking; AGRI.

Focus Area Linkage: Current to Future Force, Army Aviation, Battle Command; The Soldier, Actionable Intelligence.

P7- Provide Infrastructure - Sustain and improve predictable installation systems, power projection infrastructure, and environmental programs to improve the quality of installations and support quality training and operations. Ensure the availability of efficient, effective base operations, services and facilities.

Supporting Objectives:

- Provide installations with a minimum of C2 quality facilities to support the force by 2010 with all installations in compliance by 2023.
- Provide Power Projection Platforms/Power Support Platforms capable of meeting throughput requirements to simultaneously support two major combat operations less than 30 days apart in accordance with the 10-30-30 construct and other Army commitments.
- Provide sufficient RC infrastructure to support the capability to Train/Alert/Deploy from home station.

Supporting Initiatives: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 05; Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS); UA/UE Fielding/Stationing Plans; IMA, Installation Sustainability program; Sustainable Range program; Focused Facilities Strategy; Army Power Projection Platforms; Environmental Management Systems; Army Compatible Use Buffer Program.

Focus Area Linkage: The Soldier; Installations as Our Flagships, Actionable Intelligence.

P12-Communicate Across the Army – Establish, manage, operate, and defend a network centric environment (infostructure) that assures universal access for all Army elements to all relevant authorities, assets, and capabilities. Lead Army transformation to a knowledge-based force to enable decision dominance providing decisive advantage in full-spectrum operations.

Supporting Objectives:

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- Develop and implement a phased/blocked integrated Battle Command Systems Architecture for the Current Force that is interoperable with Joint Integrating, Functional Domain, and emerging Future Force architectures.
- Provide a Knowledge-Based Force through Knowledge Management Strategies. Maximize reach-back capabilities and home station operations centers.

Supporting Initiatives: Army Knowledge Enterprise; TS/SCI; Army Battle Command System (ABCS) Way Ahead; Software Blocking; AMEDD Transformation; Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care; Theater Medical Information Program.

Focus Area Linkage: The Network, Current to Future Force, Actionable Intelligence.

Sound Business Practice (Improve efficiency while maintaining effectiveness)

P8-Improve Business Practices - Improve business practices throughout the Army by identifying efficiency improvement opportunities and minimizing duplicative processes in the cost of operating the force.

P9-Leverage Technology into Key Processes and Equipping the Future Army - Execute Army Research and technology functions including scientific and technical information, domestic development, and integration of emerging commercial hardware and information technology

P10-Optimize Delivery of Non-Core Competencies - Manage and utilize resources in a cost effective and responsible manner to achieve Army requirements in areas outside of core competencies. Outsourcing options will be considered where quality can be maintained.

P11-Improve Acquisition Processes – Oversee the continuous improvement of the Army's Acquisition Process so that programs meet cost, design performance, schedule, supportability plans, and transformation objectives.

People (Establish a high quality of life - professionally and personally)

L1-Opportunity for Service - Provide an opportunity for service and personal development in a disciplined environment

L2-Standard of Living - Provide a competitive standard of living for all Soldiers (Active, Guard, Reserve), retirees, civilians and their families

L3-Pride and Sense of Belonging - Provide a unique culture, sense of community, and a record of accomplishment that engenders intense pride and sense of belonging amongst Soldiers (Active, Guard, Reserve), veterans, retirees, civilians, and their family members

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L4-Personal Enrichment - Provide an environment that allows Soldiers (Active, Guard, Reserve), veterans, retirees, civilians, and their family members to enrich their personal life by achieving their individual aspirations

L5-Improve & Implement Leader Development Programs - Improve & Implement Individual Development Programs – leaders, Soldiers, civilians

Resources

R1-Secure Resources: People, Dollars, Time, Institution, Installation and Infrastructure (G8 with ASA-FM&C, G3, and G1 assist) - Competitively secure appropriate funding levels for the Army. Allocate proportionally across all components – people, money, time, institutions, installation and infrastructure - against valid requirements.

Annex C: The Army Transformation Roadmap

The ATR is being published separately. Proponent is DAMO-ZT.

Annex D: The Security Environment

The geopolitical landscape has transformed over the last decade, creating new and growing demands for U.S. leadership across the globe. Protection afforded by geographic distance has diminished, while challenges and threats from the territories of weak and failing states and ungoverned space have grown. It is possible the current trend toward regional and global integration may render catastrophic inter-state war unlikely. However, the stability and legitimacy of the conventional political order in regions vital to the United States is increasingly under pressure from a variety of sources. Population growth in developing areas places a strain on government institutions and civil infrastructures. Perceptions of an unbalanced distribution of wealth, power, cultural influence, and resources between the developed and developing worlds aggravate the potential for conflict. Conducting major combat operations against a capable regional adversary or adversarial coalition remains the most demanding mission for the Joint Force.

The diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors and unpredictable regimes has become another potent threat to our homeland and our interests abroad. Traditional state-based armies, sub-national paramilitaries, transnational terrorists and even sophisticated organized crime syndicates are all becoming more capable and more dangerous. Satisfactorily offsetting the hazards of each, individually or in combination, will likely demand comprehensive, decisive and often simultaneous actions by the United States and its allies.

The current and projected security environment suggests that America's leaders will often confront simultaneous challenges around the globe. The events of the past decade present three realities: first, the United States is increasingly challenged by a diverse and dangerous set of potential adversaries that range from rising regional powers to terrorist movements and irresponsible regimes unbounded by accepted restraints governing international behavior; second, the world looks to the United States for leadership in a crisis – to the point of hazarding inaction without American participation; and finally, in many instances, only the United States has the requisite capabilities to affect enduring resolutions and acceptable outcomes for complex crises.

Key Geopolitical Trends.

While it is clear that uncertainty remains a challenge, there are a number of trends that can assist Defense and Service leaders and planners. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review identified six geopolitical trends that will profoundly shape the future security environment: (1) Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance; (2) Increasing threats to regional security; (3) Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states; (4) Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors; (5) Increasing importance of regional security arrangements; and (6) Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict.

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The President succinctly described the gravest danger to our Nation and our allies as lying at “the crossroads of radicalism and technology.” An analysis of the security environment reveals the nexus of dangerous new actors, methods, and capabilities imperil the US, its interests and its allies in strategically significant ways. First, there are now **more actors of strategic significance**. The state system created by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 remains the basis for international order, and the threat from potentially hostile regional powers remains. Non-state actors, however, operating autonomously or with state-sponsorship, are increasingly able to threaten regional and global security. For example, insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists, narco-traffickers, organized criminals – frequently networked and enabled by the same tools and information systems state actors use – are an increasing concern for the US. Relatively flat, networked, and cellular organizations such as Al Qaeda have shown themselves willing to exploit the inability or unwillingness of failed or failing states to govern their own territory and capable of decentralized execution of complex, coordinated and dispersed attacks against the US and its interests abroad.

Second, the world now faces a significant proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies and military capabilities employed by a variety of actors. Of particular note is the flood of conventional weapons on the market since the collapse of the previous bipolar system and the diffusion and improvement in existing weapons of mass destruction or effect. The ability to generate strategic effects is no longer restricted to nation-states. Also noteworthy is the fact that all state and non-state actors are potentially ‘space capable’ as a result of the commercial sector’s provision of such products as high-bandwidth satellite communications, imagery, navigation signals, and weather data. We must expect both state and non-state actors to possess and employ a combination of high and low-tech capabilities.

Third, we can expect our adversaries to increasingly rely on idiosyncratic and dangerous methods: asymmetric approaches, anti-Access and area denial strategies, unrestricted warfare, and terrorism. Given American military dominance, some adversaries will seek to bridge their conventional military gap, or lack of a conventional military capability, by adopting methods that capitalize on indirect and asymmetric approaches. For example, our adversaries may try to break our coalitions through blackmail, threats, and attacking members who maintain different policies or national objectives. They will use and exploit information systems and information gained by increased global transparency. They may attack critical infrastructure, information and communications systems, banking and finance, energy sources, transportation, water, and emergency service facilities. Adaptive adversaries will use battlespace that reduces the effectiveness of U.S. strengths – such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision engagement – and they will seek to deny U.S. operational access to critical areas. The stark reality of contemporary battlespace conditions must be incorporated into our operational readiness training at all unit and institutional levels of training.

Implications for the Joint Force

These geopolitical and international security trends point to a period of increased strategic challenges for the Joint Force. As the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review noted, “to secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future security environment is the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and U.S. Armed Forces.”²² Of particular note are six implications for the Nation, the Joint Force, and the Army.

First, there is a demonstrated **requirement for full-spectrum capabilities**. Full-spectrum capabilities allow our forces to counter any capabilities our adversaries may employ against us. We must be able to rapidly transition between missions with an appropriate mix of forces and capabilities. Second, the **changing character of war increases the need for integrated operations**. In order to address more diffuse and networked adversaries, we must integrate our own elements of power – diplomatic, military, economic, and information – and while retaining the ability to act unilaterally, we must prepare to act in concert with our friends and allies. Third, the **necessity for security cooperation endures**. Given the uncertainty of the security environment, the U.S. must remain fully engaged overseas. Security cooperation activities help shape the security environment to prevent conflict and facilitate U.S. operations in regions that may otherwise be difficult to access.

Fourth, **transformation of the Joint Force is a strategic imperative** to ensure U.S. forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives.²³ Fifth, countering threats to U.S. interests in a more interconnected security environment requires **mutually supporting regional actions integrated within a global strategy**. Sixth, a **joint perspective of the Current Operational Environment** must serve as the intellectual foundational component of Transformation that supports joint and service concept development and experimentation strategies. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with Joint Forces Command, is leading a community effort to design and develop that framework.

²² QDR, p 7.

²³ *Transformation Planning Guidance*, Department of Defense, April 2003, p. 4.